President Bush's statement, "that there is an 'axis of evil' which threatens the peace of the world," may serve to galvanise US public opinion, but it is a dangerous oversimplification of international political and military realities. In the first place, the fundamental differences between Iran, Iraq and North Korea are greater than the similarities. Second, when nations are named and blamed in this way there is a natural tendency for the citizens of those nations to rally around their leaders-no matter how odious -in order to defend their national reputations and identity. Third, this statement was very badly timed, coming as it did when the United Kingdom and other European nations have been trying to develop more positive relations with Iran in order to strengthen the hand of moderate elements seeking to expand democratic space in Iran. Fourth, there was no indication in Bush's statement about how the United States intended dealing with this so-called "axis of evil". It was high on rhetoric and low on substance.
What is becoming increasingly clear is that there is a growing difference of opinion between Europe (the United Kingdom notwithstanding) and the United States on the best ways of dealing with terrorists and terrorism. This may account for Chris Patten's (EU Commissioner in charge of External Relations), scathing attack on American foreign policy. On February 7, he accused the Bush administration of a dangerously "absolutist and simplistic" stance towards the rest of the world. Similarly the French prime minister, Lionel Jospin, warned the US "not to give in to the strong temptation of unilateralism". What seems to have upset both of these policymakers is the way in which the rhetorical gesture from Washington has undermined years of painstaking European effort to develop more constructive engagement with Iranian moderates and the North Korean regime.
While the United States seems committed to a unilateral assertion of its own power, interests and military reach; Europe is committed to identifying ways and means of solving world problems by more peaceful, regional and multilateral means. There are two very different paradigms at work here. The first is the US reliance on realpolitik (which seems much better suited to an old bipolar world rather than the new interdependent global community that is evolving) and the second is an assertion of what the conflict resolution community, and the European Union thinks of as a more collaborative approach to problem solving. This new approach is aimed at addressing the underlying causes of violence as much as its symptoms. In this paradigm, terrorism (as horrific as it is in terms of its brutal consequences) is a symptom of some very basic and unresolved problems within national regional and global political systems. To address the symptoms without tackling the root causes will not make the world a safer place.
The US administration, for example, is seeking a USD 48 billion increase in defence spending. This is the same amount as the whole world spends on development assistance each year. Europe supplies 55 percent of the world's development assistance. European policymakers, therefore, do not wish to see these pro-active development and peacebuilding initiatives challenged or undermined by a US assertion of the primacy of military solutions. One thing that European integration has taught politicians on this side of the
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Atlantic is the primacy of the political over the military in the resolution of economic, social and political conflicts.
There are some growing and rather fundamental differences between Europe and North America. These are epitomised to some extent by John Bolton, US undersecretary of state for Arms Control. He has condemned multilateralism as a threat to American sovereignty. It was he who withdrew from talks on a convention limiting light weapons and small arms because it would have "undermined America's constitutional right to carry arms". When his comments are added to American opposition to the International Criminal Court, the global ban on anti personnel land mines, action against biological weapons, the comprehensive test ban treaty and the Kyoto treaty on climate change it is clear that there is a growing ideological gulf between the ways in which the United States and most European government's seek to achieve and maintain their security.
As a number of articles in this issue highlight, it is vital that the so-called 'War on Terrorism' does not distract the attention of the world community from all the other problems that have to be addressed in Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. It is particularly important that it does not result in a withdrawal of international concern for a rapid resolution of the Palestinian/ Israel crisis. It is particularly important that the war on terrorism does not challenge or subvert the regional and multilateral relationships that have been developed and nurtured over the past 55 years. There is no place in a shrunken world for unconstrained unilateralism. This means that we all need to direct much more attention toward medium to long-term peace building rather than short term crisis management.
Second, we must generate more popular political will behind the conflict prevention agendas of the Swedish and Belgium presidencies. These two countries developed very exciting and challenging agenda for conflict prevention and it is important that action plans are developed to give substance to these agenda and that they are implemented in full. (In this regard it is vital that a split does not emerge between the more "interventionist" inclinations of Northern Europe and the more "pragmatic" concerns of South European nations who seem to prefer a less interventionist stance when it comes to security issues).
Third, it is clear that governmental and intergovernmental organisations are not going to be able to deal with the underlying causes of violence, terrorism and war alone. It is important to incorporate the private sector in this enterprise as well. Fourth, it is important that commissioner Patten has signalled a desire for a transatlantic dialogue on the two different approaches to peace and peacebuilding that seem to be emerging between Washington and Brussels. This dialogue would be even more focussed if the EU could agree to direct more EU resources to conflict prevention; identify ways of enhancing better coordination between the different pillars and if it would develop a separate budget line for conflict prevention and long-term peace building. While there are many different sources of violence, poverty, social exclusion, and marginalisation (especially when added to religious and value-based movements) are particularly important structural sources that have to be addressed. The EU is in a unique position to develop the means for doing so.
These are undoubtedly turbulent times. It is vital that the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, European Peacebilding Liaison Office and all the organisations and individuals represented in these networks, renew their dedication to understanding, analysing and removing the root causes of violence while working to deal with its particular manifestations. The war on terrorism has uncertain objectives, it is difficult, therefore, to know how to evaluate its impact and effectiveness.
The new military fronts being opened up in the Philippines, Somalia and Yemen add further complexity and generate their own specific challenges for peacemakers. The task for those of us working to put in place more nonviolent ways of dealing with these problems is (i) to counter the totalising unilateralist and military ideology of the United States administration (ii) reinforce the more peacefully oriented strategies of Chris Patten and the EU (iii) stimulate deep transatlantic dialogue on the two foreign policy paradigms and (iv) continue our work on building connectors and relationships between warring parties so that we might identify collaborative and negotiated solutions to those political, military, economic and social problems likely to generate both direct and indirect violence.Moreover, the context in which humanitarian agencies provide food, shelter and other necessary material to people affected by war, cannot be separated from the conflict or postconflict situation. Therefore, the linkage or debate on aid and conflict was one of the main issues at the Soesterberg conference, and is also discussed in the chapter Aid and Conflict: Feeding Armies and Militias or Supporting a Path to Peace?
One of the aims of the international Lessons Learned project is to facilitate organisations in their learning practices. This is done through regional seminars in different parts of the world, by organising the conference in October and by compiling the publication described above. The ECCP plans to continue facilitating the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and new ideas and follow-up projects are being developed towards this.  Price: EUR 7.50 (excl. postage)
For order information please contact the European Centre for Conflict Prevention at info@conflict-prevention.net
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After September 11, it is understandable that the Spanish Presidency has made combating terrorism its number one priority during its presidency. Terrorism demands a comprehensive and co-ordinated international response and it is right that the EU has a role to play. The Spanish Presidency has an ambitious agenda to consolidate the EU's importance, visibility and credibility in the world through strengthening the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, this must be balanced with other EU priorities that address the root causes of conflict and instability. The tragic events of September 11 and the emergence of a serious security threat from international terrorist organisations residing in areas suffering from protracted conflict and state failure underlines the need for the EU to redouble its efforts to promote development, effective conflict prevention and resolution. There is now a real opportunity to rethink foreign policies to enhance global security and reduce injustice.
Terrorism and the CFSP
In taking forward the plan to combat terrorism drawn up by the extraordinary European Council of September 21, the Spanish Presidency will largely focus on internal 'aspects' such as strengthening the instruments of the rule of law throughout the EU; promoting greater co-operation between the security bodies of the member states, including activities such as enhanced airport security and tackling money laundering. The Spanish Government would like to see the EU becoming a decisive player in fighting international terrorist networks, co-operating closely with the UN in areas such as achieving a comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism and through assessing EU relations with third countries with regard to their cooperation in the fight against terrorism.
In the wake of September 11, the development of the CFSP has been viewed with greater importance. Here the Presidency's priorities lie in boosting the military capabilities of the EU, with a view to making the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operational as soon as possible and extending consultation and co-operation relations with NATO. In building up and implementing the crisis management 
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Combating terrorism number one priority x Priorities for the Spanish and Danish EU Presidencies x The role of the private sector in conflict x Update and International Calendar procedures, Spain intends to push forward measures so that the EU acquires the civil and military capacity to carry out the Petersberg Operations by 2003. To achieve this, the Spanish Presidency has established clear objectives for all four areas of civilian crisis management: the rule of law, civil administration, civil protection and policing. Steps will be taken to ensure that the Gothenberg Summit's target of 5000 international police officers will be met, and that procedures for their improved management and coordination will be adopted. Recruitment of extra international judiciary, public prosecutors and prison staff to underpin the rule of law, where progress has been slower, will be accelerated. Alongside this, the powers of the Civilian Aspects Committee will be reinforced and the Union's analytical and forecasting capacity will be improved by developing greater coordination amongst intelligence services. These commitments are welcome, as they will provide a more substantial framework within which civilian crisis prevention capability can be enhanced.
Regional focus
As far as regional priorities are concerned, Latin America figures prominently on the agenda of the Spanish Presidency and there is also a commitment not to neglect the EU's Balkan policy. Following the terrorist attacks, new priority countries and regions have been added. The Spanish Government wants the EU to re-examine its relations with Pakistan, India and Iran, and to work closely with the UN in all matters regarding the future of Afghanistan. Developing further relations with the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia has also been highlighted.
Spain has a particular interest in promoting the Common Strategy for the Mediterranean region, currently stalled by underfunding and differences of opinion over the Middle East. The first problem can be addressed by accelerating the decentralisation of already committed disbursements. The second would require giving a new impetus to the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) by reopening dialogue with countries that feel their views are sidelined. Calling a summit of the Heads of State of the 27 EMP member countries would be an effective way to re-launch regional co-operation.
Traditionally the EU has concentrated on reacting to conflict in strategic, visible locations (for example the Balkans and the Middle East) at the expense of the poorest countries where most violent conflict takes place. It is important that the shift in focus to Afghanistan does not mean that even less attention is paid to addressing latent tensions and violent conflict in other parts of the world. A key lesson has to be that crisis management is not enough and more resources and political will are needed for longer-term conflict prevention.
A role for conflict preventionaddressing the root causes of terrorism Concrete commitments to take forward and monitor the implementation of the long-term conflict prevention agenda appear conspicuous in their absence on the Spanish Presidency agenda. This is both surprising and disappointing. The tragic events of September 11 revealed serious security threats to the EU from those areas suffering from protracted conflict and state failure which provide a fertile breeding ground and operational base for terrorist networks. As long as the divide in wealth between North and South increases, as well as between the elite and poor majority in developing countries, then conflict and instability will be an ever-present threat. This should provide an added urgency for the EU to redouble its efforts to strengthen and use all instruments at its disposal (including development co-operation and trade) to promote development, effective conflict prevention and resolution beyond its borders and address the root causes of conflict. Placing disproportionate emphasis on crisis management and internal policing instruments only addresses one part of the overall picture.
Implementing conflict prevention commitments A great deal was achieved under the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies in terms of developing a policy framework in the field of conflict prevention for the EU. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts (June 2001), the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention (April 2001) and the Cotonou Agreement on trade and aid offer, respectively, a strategic outline, concrete recommendations for reform and a commitment to placing conflict prevention and political dialogue at the heart of coordinated, cohesive policy making. A key and logical role for the Spanish Presidency should therefore be to place conflict prevention high on its agenda and take up the challenge of ensuring that current commitments are effectively translated into practical action.
Fortunately, it would appear that the Spanish Presidency is committed to taking forward at least some elements of the conflict prevention agenda. Whilst it has not been made a key priority and it does not feature in the formal statements of intent, the Spanish government will fulfil its mandate of evaluating the progress of the implementation of the EU programme for the prevention of violent conflicts agreed at the Gothenberg European Council in 2001 and will present the findings at the European Council in Seville in June 2002. This evaluation, due to be prepared at a seminar in March 2002, will examine the contributions of the Council, Commission and EU member states to the programme. In a welcome move, the Spanish Presidency has also stated that it will put increased emphasis on political dialogue as a mechanism of conflict prevention and will also seek to strengthen cultural dialogue between the EU and the Islamic world as an element of the fight against terrorism.
In • Train and restructure law enforcement bodies, so that they have both the specialisation and the flexibility to understand and respond to new threats posed by criminal networks.
Working with the private sector
The forthcoming Corporate Social Responsibility White Paper offers an opportunity to make a direct link between better business practice and reducing the causes of conflict. The EU should take the opportunity to endorse initiatives of other international bodies (UN, ILO and OECD) on the private sector, social policy and conflict prevention. Parties whose interests are served by continuing conflict depend on continuing external revenue. There is now a wide consensus that transnational corporations which plan their operations without accurate analysis of local conflict indicators may ultimately jeopardise their own investments. The EU should encourage member states to advise the corporate sector to take an inclusive approach to trade and conflict by, for instance, insisting on the transparency of deals with host governments, encouraging diversification of production and adopting non-exclusionary recruitment and trading practice.
The EU should: • Use the Cotonou Agreement and
Country Strategy Papers to encourage corporations to include equitable resource distribution, anticorruption and respect for human rights in their long-term investment strategies.
• Create a legally binding framework for regulating European transnational corporations operating in developing countries.
• Support the adoption and implementation of international certification of diamonds, which is enforced through a legally binding agreement.
Reforming EU institutions
Despite the ongoing reforms of EC external assistance and institutional development within the framework of the emerging CFSP, the institutional, management and decision making set up is not yet optimal in order to facilitate the effective implementation of conflict prevention commitments and policies.
Further efforts need to be made to increase coherence and linkages between conflict prevention activities undertaken within the framework of pillar one, in particular development aid and short-term crisis management undertaken within the framework of pillar 2 (CFSP). The impact of the reform of EC aid and the process of "mainstreaming" conflict prevention needs to be monitored carefully.
The Spanish and Danish Presidencies should ensure that the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), established within the Secretariat of the Council reaches its potential. In particular it lacks the capacity to undertake analysis on the basis of information received from a wide range of conflict affected regions, tending rather to focus on areas of immediate strategic interest to the EU. 
No reference to conflict prevention
It was hoped that the Green Paper would explore the role of the private sector in conflict -an emerging aspect of CSR. The EU's role in promoting business activity to prevent conflict was highlighted in the European Communication on Conflict Prevention last April 2001 which cited the Green Paper as an opportunity to address the issue. The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts similarly called for co-operation between the EU and the private sector on conflict prevention. However, although covering areas of human rights, local resources and communities, the Green Paper does not link these to conflict or explicitly mention the business and conflict connection. By structuring the discussion of the private sector within the existing CSR framework, the Green Paper fails to engage the potential contribution of the private sector in the field of conflict prevention. It is hoped that the involvement of DG Development and DG RELEX in the follow up to the Green Paper will rectify this problem by introducing more explicit reference to conflict prevention.
Voluntary initiatives or regulation
One of the key issues in the CSR debate and in turn the role of the private sector in conflict is whether voluntary codes or regulation is the right way to address the problem. The Green Paper has received criticism for solely promoting the voluntary nature of CSR. This is inconsistent with the European 
What the EU should do
There are a number of ways in which the EU can begin to address the role of the private sector in conflict both in terms of its negative and potentially positive contribution. Firstly, the EU could promote better regulation through a system of regulation and voluntary initiatives. Secondly, the EU could do more to de-link arms purchases and natural resources such as conflict diamonds, but also other war commodities. Thirdly, the EU could seek to engage the private sector in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and in particular those articles relevant to consultation and dialogue with non-state actors within which companies can and should fall. COARM, the Council working group on conventional arms, has drawn up a list of non-military security and police equipment, the export of which should be monitored to avoid human rights violations in the country of final destination. Member states plan to agree on a definitive system for controlling these exports. COARM also wants to begin proceedings on effective control by the authorities of each member state on the electronic transfer of the software and technology associated with items on the common list. It was proposed that the system for the control of exports of dual-use goods could serve as a model in this respect.
The Balkans, Africa and Afghanistan
The General Affairs Council, in November, adopted conclusions on the Balkans. It launched an appeal for the Stability Pact to better support the EU's policy for the region. The Council also adopted conclusions on Africa which cover the Great Lakes region, DRC, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Eritrea. On the eve of a ministerial troika visit to the Great Lakes Region, the Council adopted a common position on Rwanda and a joint action on Burundi whereby it would release euro 9.5 million to support the deployment of a special protection unit, provisionally composed of a South African battalion. The Council welcomed the Commission's signing of the National Indicative Programme with Burundi. In its conclusions on Afghanistan the Council calls on the Afghan forces to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. It warns that "the responsible behaviour of the new Afghan leaders in this areas will constitute a deciding factor for the aid which the European Union is prepared to provide for the country's reconstruction." The Council announced that it will step up its dialogue with the countries in the region in order to contribute to the region's stability and has appointed Klaus-Peter Klaiber as Special Representative for Afghanistan.
The Laeken European Council
The European Council, which met in Laeken, Belgium, on December 15, 2001, declared that the EU is now capable of conducting 'some' crisis management operations. The annex to the conclusions of the Belgian Presidency 4 , which deals with the operational capability of the common European security and defence policy, states, "The Union will be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop." This leaves the EU far behind its original objective, which was to declare the operational capability for the full range of Petersberg Tasks.
The European Parliament
Trade in Small Arms
The European Parliament passed a resolution on November 15, 2001 welcoming the UN Programme of Action on small arms of July 2001 5 . Concerns were expressed, however, about the failure of the compromise document to adequately and comprehensively address problems arising from the proliferation and misuse of small arms. In particular, the resolution draws attention to the lack of national and international mechanisms to control arms brokerage, transport and financing, and the failure of the Action Programme to include concrete measures to address this problem. It therefore calls on the EU Presidency to "appoint a Contact Group of States to pave the way for negotiations on a legally-binding international instrument regulating the activities of arms brokers" and urges Member States and Associated States to adopt a series of concrete measures to establish and improve brokering controls. It also deplores the lack of global norms on arms transfers and calls for agreement of a legally-binding international convention on arms transfers.
Conflict prevention report
The European Parliament adopted a report on conflict prevention drafted by the Dutch MEP Joost Lagendijk 6 . In the report, the EP criticises the incoherence of the pillar structure and requests a reexamination of the pillar-structure during the next institutional reform. The EP affirmed that conflict prevention should be integrated into Union programmes and stressed that it must become a horizontal factor of all joint EU policies. The EP also stressed that the EU needs to increase the budget for it foreign policy. The Parliament called for a non-military rapid deployment unit In the Soviet era, unrest in Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan) was managed and held in check through the highly centralised political structure. Although the Kremlin's propaganda of proletarian internationalism played a somewhat positive role in achieving rapprochement among ethnic groups, it did not provide any mechanism, free from paternalist ideology, guardianship, and strict control from the centre, for natural cooperation based on mutual economic interests and horizontal links. The Central Asian states entered the postcommunist era suffering from sharp economic decline and experiencing ethnic and political divisions, a legacy of ethnic and religious violence and Soviet border demarcation.
The five relatively homogeneous states of Central Asia have been unable to prevent conflict in the region. Experts argue that the Central Asian region is sitting on a time bomb that could explode at any moment. International terrorism, violent religious extremism, organized crime, poverty, and drug trafficking represent increasing challenges to the security of Central Asia. Underdevelopment and deprivation, poor governance, overpopulation, scarcity of water, and environmental stress greatly contribute to underlying sources of conflict in Central Asia. The essential differences with regard to cultural backgrounds, level of political and economic development, and degree of transformation and democratisation in the five Central Asian states will increase. There are also different perceptions with respect to a conflict-prevention agenda in Central Asia among governments, international organisations, nongovernmental organisations, and scholars. In some cases conflict-prevention measures are perceived by Central Asian governments as a challenge to a state's sovereignty and an opportunity to muzzle any opposition within the country.
Some strategies for stability in Central Asia
The There is an alarming tendency to equate Islam with extremism just because a small group of young people are motivated by religion to engage in activities fomenting social unrest, and use religion to justify their terrorist activities. Anti-Islamic propaganda and the oversimplification of the current religious situation in Central Asia may lead to flawed decisionmaking. One evidence of that is the increasing deportation of citizens of neighbouring states, mainly traders, and the tightening passport and visa regime that restricts people's movement within Central Asia. Although all Central Asian leaders declare common goals and concerns over terrorism, each country has its own agenda and is engaged in rivalry with its neighbours. The Washington Tashkent alliance is changing the role of Uzbekistan in the region. For Uzbekistan, it might be a slippery slope not only in the form of further repression of zealous Muslims and other religious believers, but in continuing land-mining and a hurried demarcation of borders with weaker countries such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. engagement in Central Asia is also a serious test for Russian influence in the region.
It is clear that in the Central Asian security arena, small and poor countries are more affected than others; Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan could strengthen their independence. International and local experts suggest consultations and negotiation with the external opposition in Uzbekistan. Local actors such as governments, NGOs, or regional organisations may be able to deal with smallscale crises with mediation, conciliation, and assistance with negotiations. Central Asian states should encourage joint actions involving the international community focusing on conflict resolution in Afghanistan. The West may also support intervention to end conflict at whatever stages of development such conflicts have reached.
Development of civil society
There is an urgent need to enhance the capacity and expertise of NGOs in long-term conflict prevention. All governments in Central Asia are still suspicious of nonstate actors. Therefore they are reluctant to grant a monitoring or "intelligence" function to NGOs working together in a network, even though such a network could provide an effective early warning service and might also serve to direct attention to emerging issues. NGOs in Central Asia can also play important roles in actually intervening in conflict situations to ease tensions, and to provide mediation and facilitation functions. Increasing regional co-operation among state officials and NGOs would be extremely beneficial in progressive political and democratic reforms, including the strengthening of the rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights.
Joint programs between Central Asian and Western grassroots organisations are of particular value. It is important to co-operate in the area of conflict prevention and human rights. It is only by embracing the idea of universal human rights that ethnic or subethnic group interests can be transcended in the region. The donors and international organisations could use their influence to encourage improvements in legislative procedures and to facilitate moves toward truly law-abiding civic societies that would replace autocratic governmental structures headed by territorialbased clans or families. The work of NGOs in intervening to resolve disputes should be improved, as well as their capacities to provide policy-relevant information and analysis.
There is a real need for effective monitoring and systematic research in the Ferghana Valley, shared by three states. Monitoring, in and of itself, acts as a stabilising factor in Central Asia. It allows ethnic and social interests to be manifested and leads to reduced tension. The participation and attention of external parties would induce more responsible attitudes from stakeholders on conflict-related issues. To prevent the recurrence of violent conflict in Central Asia, more research on the causes of such conflicts needs to be conducted, and the necessary theoretical models need to be created to help analyse future eventualities.
The open-minded and well-educated people in nongovernmental and governmental sectors are eager to participate in critical discussions on the problems of democratisation and conflict prevention. They may monitor conflict and provide early warning and insight into situations in Tajikistan, the Ferghana Valley, and other areas; provide a neutral forum where key stakeholders can discuss factors contributing to destabilisation of the social, ethnic, and religious situation; initiate mediation between conflicting parties (for example, between the IMU and the government of Uzbekistan); initiate education and training for conflict resolution and conflict prevention; advocate press freedom and initiate media activities; monitor elections and prevent electoral violence; and warn of potentially violent situations.
More effective participation of women in the male-dominated decisionmaking and security processes in Central Asia is essential. Protection, assistance, and training for refugee women, internally displaced women, and children in need of international protection must be articulated and advocated. The gender aspect in the conflict-prevention agenda should not be neglected.
Other urgent strategies to establish more stability in the region would include tackling the unresolved economic problems, fostering regional co-operation for conflict prevention, attacking narco-trafficking, reinforcing the peace process in Tajikistan, anticipating the militarisation of the Caspian subregion and increasing external aid and international intervention.
The effectiveness of conflict-prevention efforts depends to a large extent on the actions undertaken by many key actors on their own and in collaboration with other key actors. But it would be wrong to embrace a one-size-fits-all approach to conflict prevention in Central Asia. Of course no single measure can completely eliminate tensions in the region and prevent conflict, but it is possible to counteract and drift toward destabilisation, to minimise the risk of ethnic cleansing, and in so doing, to save the lives of potential victims. However, compared to the level of instability and economic hardship, the current efforts of the various stakeholders to improve the situation and prevent conflict are woefully inadequate. The Central Asian region can serve as an incubator for a more peaceful future if proper efforts are made, or it can become a place of disaster for the millions of people who live there.
 * Anara Tabyshalieva is director of the Institute for Regional Studies in Kyrgyzstan. This text is the first part of an article that appears in Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia. (February 2002)
Conflict Prevention in Central Asia -The Role of the OSCE
Conference organised by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Friday March 8, 2002 at the Netherlands Ministry for Foreign Affairs in The Hague.
This conference will bring together representatives of European and Central Asian governments, the OSCE, intergovernmental organisations, civil society groups from Central Asia, international NGOs, and scholars specialising in the region. Issues that will be discussed include the sources of conflicts in Central Asia; new threats to the region; changing security; the possibilities and constraints for conflict prevention and peace building; the peace process in Tajikistan; and the role of the OSCE, other intergovernmental organisations as well as NGOs. The CCM was established in 1995 as a nongovernmental, non-profit organisation. It has five major spheres of activity: educational programmes; research and monitoring; promotion of non-violent conflict resolution, peace and tolerance; the institutional development of NGOs and developing co-operation among NGOs working for conflict management and civic education; and practical activities in conflict management and prevention.
Speakers include Max van der
When the CCM was established in 1995 this concept was very new, not only to the wider public, but within civil society as well. However, since that time a number of organisations have appeared which work in this sphere, some due to CCM's direct or indirect assistance.
This of course has not developed as rapidly as one might have desired, but awareness-raising and promotional work has always been a major focus of the CCM's work. For example, in 1999, the CCM in co-operation with International Alert (UK) established the Central Asian conflict management NGO network, which currently unites around thirty local NGOs working on issues such as human rights, civic education, ethnic relations, gender issues, and refugee related issues. Awareness-raising has entailed considerable educational and promotional work, the latter involving the media, production and dissemination of publications and other material. During the six years of its existence the CCM has published eight books on conflict management, tolerance and civic education, mostly manuals and research papers, both in the Kazakh and Russian languages.
The CCM educational programme has probably been the most intensive. In 1998, CCM initiated a programme that proved to be very efficient. In cooperation with Responding To Conflict (UK), CCM organised a two-week seminar on conflict management. It was targeted at teachers, because of their contacts with students, parents, other teachers and school administration. Numerous handouts on conflict issues were translated for the seminar, which then formed a basis for a comprehensive seminar report. The seminar was very successful and it was decided to continue it on regular basis. This is the origin of the CCM-idea of Summer Schools. To date, four Summer Schools have been organised. More NGOs have developed and the target group has gradually expanded to incorporate trade unions, journalists and government officials. Correspondingly, the content has changed: more time is allocated for training specific skills, such as negotiation and mediation. One of the Summer School principles distributes useful literature to the participants at the end of the school, so that it can be taken home and shared with colleagues and target groups. Despite the fact that the Summer Schools are very intensive, they still leave many questions unanswered, and the books are intended to stimulate participants to further learning. The CCM regularly monitors the activities initiated by the participants, and this turns out to be quite an impressive list. Participants have established new NGOs, carried out promotional work with the media, taught peace and tolerance at schools and universities, facilitated training for different target groups, and worked directly with the community, etc.
In fact, for the CCM, continuity and complementarity have become underlying principles. For example, in 1998-2000 it organised a series of training sessions for teachers in human rights education. The follow-up project was a human rights education conference in late 2000 with a strong lobby component with the Kazakh Ministry of Education. A process was initiated, and as a result the National Concept of Civic Education was adopted in July 2001, which makes civic education an obligatory subject in the school curriculum. Meanwhile, the CCM has also translated a manual on human rights and conducted research on the levels of tolerance, as well as continuing smaller-scale seminars for teachers.
The Centre for Conflict Management's achievements were recognised in 1998 when it received the Democracy and Civil Society Award, a prize given by the European Union and the United States in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan and the 40th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.  
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Following its independence in 1991, Tajikistan experienced a tragic civil war that brought the country to the edge of catastrophe. After the signing of a peace accord in 1997, the country entered into the process of peacebuilding. However, the impact of the civil war was enormous and its consequences will continue to be felt for a considerable time. The war resulted in 60,000 deaths (1 per cent of the national population), 25,000 widows, and 55,000 orphans. Material losses were estimated at USD 7 billion, almost eighteen years of GDP at the current level. One of every six Tajiks was displaced by the war: more than 250,000 persons fled the country, 700,000 were internally displaced. Society was torn apart by the religious and political controversies, and large parts of the population have to deal with the resulting moral and psychological traumas. Criminality and violence expanded largely as a result of the situation created by the war.
The situation also had major consequences for the situation of women in Tajik society. The gender gap was strengthened in all spheres -economic, political, cultural, and familial. For Tajikistan, where 73 per cent of the population live in rural areas, the most powerful barrier to achieving equal opportunities are the traditional stereotypes about female and male roles. The sphere of gender issues in the city and in the village is different. Urban women have achieved major successes in decreasing gender inequality. The gender gap between men and women in the city in getting secondary and professional education, in the level of economic activity (employment), in access to decisionmaking, and access to the health infrastructure is considerably less when compared with rural society. The average life expectancy of urban men is less than for women by 9.4 years (rural -only on 3.2). Statistics show that the situation of women is worse with respect to income levels, employment in leading positions and in the high salary spheres of the national economy, and in university education.
During the armed conflict many women lost their men, their defenders and breadwinners. Together with those whose husbands became refugees or labour migrants, they were forced to take the burden of keeping their households on their own shoulders. These women started to search for additional sources of income. Market trading as a form of survival became a major occupation of all groups of women, regardless of their educational and professional levels. Women started to do traditional male jobs, such as growing cereals and vegetables on private plots and gardens.
Following the civil war, the consequent break-up of civil society and socio-economic difficulties of the post-conflict period created conditions that permitted the growth of criminality and violence in the community. Violence against women is felt in all spheres of women's life, from the private to social. There is always a possibility of becoming a victim of violence. Wife beating is a common problem. In both urban and rural areas, many cases of wife beating go unreported and many of those cases reported are not investigated. The problems of "domestic" and "psychological" violence have become very real in Tajikistan.
The increasing feminisation of poverty, prostitution, drug addiction and other negative social phenomena are causing the situation to worsen. The share of female criminality has grown. In recent years Tajik women have committed especially serious crimes including gangsterism, robberies, murders, and many crimes connected with narcotics trafficking.
The stereotypical view that a woman should be under the protection of a man and the revival of Islam in the region has resulted in the introduction of polygamy into Tajikistan -a new phenomenon in the country. Polygamy is now an everyday occurrence, largely because of the low economic status of women preventing them maintaining themselves, uncertainty in the future, absence of security, etc. Marriages are conducted in a religious ceremony called "nikoh" with the agreement of the parents of the fiancée (bride). In these cases second and third wives have no legal entitlement to joint property, inheritance or their part of the estate in case of divorce, or death of the husband. The full economic dependence and absence of legal rights deprives them of the opportunity to make choices in social and economic activity.
But social and political life is being slowly reformed and a programme of transition to the market economy is being elaborated. Women have played an increasingly large role in all these processes, especially during the last five years. The number of women's organisations has grown from three in 1995 to more than 128 presently working in all regions of Tajikistan. Women NGOs have proven to be the most active private organisations, which largely results from the significant challenges women have faced during the transition period after the fall of the Soviet Union.
After the civil war in the early 1990s, women were initially inclined to look to the state for their well-being as in Soviet times. From 1996, civic and economic initiatives became more frequent, especially for women between the ages of 30-50. As a rule, this age group supported their families, which no longer received a guaranteed income from the husband. During this period, rural women largely focused on economic projects, such as setting up small enterprises in micro-credit programs and marketing their handicrafts. Women in urban areas developed educational projects, including programs for rural women; published civics handbooks and newspapers; conducted research projects; and established women's crisis
Tajikistan
Women's groups build a new Tajik civil society
A tragic civil war in newly-independent Tajikistan had major impacts on the situation of women in the country. In the post-conflict peace building efforts however, women's organisations have played a decisive role o By Alla Kuvatova
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centres. These projects were initiated as a way of drawing women into the economy and into community participation. The projects were developed and managed by women themselves. Goals were both operative and long-term. First, they were restoring destroyed dwellings for the returning refugees and rendering assistance to children-orphans, as well as support and help to families which lost the breadwinners during the military conflict. Secondly they were supporting and upholding women's civil and political rights, civil and legal education, the upbringing of women leaders, and the socialisation of women etc.
About half of woman NGOs work on the construction of civil society. The priority of this strand in NGO activity is determined by the traditionally formed gender roles of the family, which are mirrored in all the main structures of social life. As the rights of women have been extended, many women's problems formerly considered private (such as cruelty and domestic violence) have come to be recognised as problems of society. The gender injustice is particularly strong in rural areas. This fact is aggravated by poor communication, lack of access to information and education, low migration mobility of rural women, poverty and other factors.
As the number of organisations has risen, qualitative changes have also occurred. In the early years, NGOs primarily worked within a vertical hierarchy that led from the donor to the organisation to the target group. Now NGOs work more horizontally with local counterparts in conferences, seminars and joint projects. In the past two years, women's NGOs have begun to form coalitions to lobby for their interests, in particular to increase the representation of women in appointed and elected government positions.
As a result of this campaign, in December 1999 the country's president issued a decree entitled "On Increasing the Role of Women in the Society". The decree charged the government with appointing qualified women to leadership positions in the ministries, state committees, agencies, judicial bodies, and educational institutions. Shortly after the president issued this decree, the number of women in both national and local governments increased markedly. Eight women were elected to the lower parliament, Majlisi Namoyandagon in the 2000 elections. These women represent just 13 per cent of the total number of seats in the lower house (compared to 3 per cent in the old Majlisi Oli). The National Program on the Main Directions of State Policy on Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities for Men and Women (2000) was developed by mutual efforts of the scientists, professionals and representatives from women's NGOs and its implementation is now being discussed at the different levels of Tajik society.
NGOs and community groups have become an alternative for women interested in becoming more active. Unlike membership in a political party, NGO activism is seen as largely apolitical. But they can, however, help to get people involved in politics, and they can promote their interests in the upper echelons of power where policies are determined. Unlike political parties, which usually stand in opposition to one another, NGOs can collaborate with several political parties at once.
During the 2000 parliamentary election campaign, many NGOs, including women's groups, helped organise roundtables, training seminars, civil forums and debates, giving candidates equal opportunities to promote their election platforms to the voters. Women, as compared to men, are generally more motivated to achieve agreement among competing points of view than to achieve personal leadership. It is possible that this differing attitude determines the agendas that men and women pursue in their community involvement and in the country's political life.
All these facts testify that non-governmental organisations and movements can help to counter the centralisation and the expansion of state power and facilitate civil accountability and control. They can also help to ensure the participation of people in the political process, creating informal channels in parallel with formal democratic institutions. The experiences of Tajikistan in the resolution of its armed conflict and peacebuilding at different levels of society is important and useful in itself, but it can also be considered a successful model for other countries having involved in a conflict situation or experiencing the complications of a post-conflict period.  
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OPEN ASIA has a mandate to cover rule of law and human rights issues. Currently the programme is broadcast on approximately forty local stations throughout the region, reaching a potential audience of twenty million.
Internews created OPEN ASIA in an effort to offer alternate sources of information to Central Asian viewers about their countries, and as a vehicle to improve the production skills of Central Asian television journalists. The
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In Uzbekistan there are 4,200 million ha of irrigated lands. This is less than 10 per cent of the total territory of Uzbekistan, and 20 per cent of the arable lands, however, 90 per cent of the agricultural production of Uzbekistan is produced on irrigated lands. The majority of the population (75 per cent) of Uzbekistan lives in the irrigated areas. The main condition for sustainable agricultural production in the irrigated lands is the availability of water resources. The irrigation system of Uzbekistan is part of the unique water system of Central Asia. Ninety per cent of the water resources are received from two rivers systems, Syrdarya and Amudarya. These two river systems have more than seventeen different reservoirs for regulating water resources -they are filled in flood years for use in times of drought.
During the Soviet era, the water systems worked mainly for the irrigation of lands in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. The soviet-era water system of Central Asia was irrigation oriented. But, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, each country in Central Asia claimed ownership of the systems in its territory and the unique water system of Central Asia broke down. Each country now tries to use the water resources of the two main rivers for its own interests. Also, the operation and maintenance of the water reservoirs, which were previously funded by the centralised union budget, is now the responsibility of the country, in which it is situated. All this has had its impact on the sustainable water supply for irrigation. In the last two years there has been severe drought and farmers (especially independent farmers and farmers of family plots) are feeling the water scarcity.
Traditionally Uzbek farmers have been self-sufficient food producers. Even in the soviet period, 60 per cent of family income in the rural areas was received from family plots. At present 90 per cent of all rural family income comes from family-owned plots. Food crops like vegetables, rice and wheat are grown there. But, the scarcity of water resources is impacting on the yields of crops in these plots. For example, in the last two years in the Khorazem region (Aral Sea disaster zone) lands under rice (a popular food and cash crop for the region) declined by up to 60 per cent because of the water scarcity. Families planned to receive five time more income, than they invested if the yield was good. Instead they lost all their investments. There was a similar situation in Karakalpakistan, in the Ferghana Valley. Local people tend to look for easy answers in reaction to the water shortage. Most local people in the Khorazem think that water is scarce because the Turkmen people are using more water for irrigation. In the Ferghana Valley local farmers think that water scarcity is the result of the Kyrgyz government policy of using water for power generation. These are strong signals of possible water-related conflicts in the region. Both Khorazem and Ferghana have close borders with Turkmenistan and Kyrgizistan. Their people share water from one source, which makes the situation more dangerous.
How can this problem be solved? The most progressive solution would be for Central Asian countries to sign agreements on water sharing and the operation of this unique water system. This would be the most effective way of preventing the problem. But, it will require protracted negotiation. At present, these negotiations on water agreement have not even started.
For an effective prevention of possible water-related conflicts during the drought periods it will be necessary to locate the places of possible conflicts and to educate people on water conservation. This will also help improve the water use efficiency and the agriculture productivity. 
Madina Najimova is president of Suvchi, an NGO based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Large potential for conflict on water share
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the shared water systems in Central Asia also broke down. Coupled with recent severe droughts, this has resulted in a dangerous situation. Negotiations on sharing water between the five governments have not yet started x By Madina Najimova OPEN ASIA is a weekly television magazine programme that covers and is broadcast in Kazahkstan, the Krygyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Produced since 1998, it is the only public interest programme in Central Asia to cover regional issues from a local perspective, as opposed to government-sponsored or sanctioned programming conveying government views and policies
x By Ivan Sigal
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OPEN ASIA informs Central Asians about their neighbours
programme is produced entirely by local journalists and cameramen. Producers come not only from the capital cities, but also out of many provincial cities and towns, from Khorog in Tajikistan's Pamiri mountains to Aktiubinsk on Kazakhstan's northwestern steppe, and from the densely populated and volatile Ferghana Valley to Uzbekistan's arid and empty western desert. With the division of Central Asia into independent states, a regional culture that combined influences of many ethnic groups, religions, and languages has become increasingly fragmented, its peoples isolated from one another in states whose boundaries bear little resemblance to traditional cultural demarcations.
The repercussions for the peoples of Central Asia have been serious. Border controls, power, water, and gas blockades, populations of ethnic groups cut off from their compatriots and without political representation, the degradation of a common industrial infrastructure, a stifling of trade and the flow of information, and decreasing contacts between peoples. Such isolation is a precondition for more serious conflicts.
This isolation includes access to information. Predominant information sources remain government or governmentaffiliated broadcasters and newspapers, or television from the Russian government . These state broadcasters devote little time to the problems of their neighbours, and the existing coverage is strictly official, with biases intended to support the policy of the government in question. Apart from OPEN ASIA, locally produced independent media coverage about the region does not exist.
Furthermore, most Central Asian governments have instituted legislation that limits sources of, and access to, information, for instance denying stations the right to rebroadcast programming from foreign network providers, or practising informal censorship on both the local and national level. In addition, both governmental and non-governmental journalists practice extensive self-censorship, especially about such delicate issues as regional relations. Finally, customs regulations in most Central Asian states require that books, videotapes, film, and computer discs be inspected and approved prior to import or export; and in fact confiscation of such materials by customs officers is a regular occurrence.
OPEN ASIA has given Central Asian journalists the opportunity both to participate in and to broadcast a challenging, uncensored, and balanced programme on current events and regional issues that they consider vital to their viewers. The program pushes journalists to make better television, and carry out better reporting, focusing on stories about the problems of real people, telling stories through their eyes. This in contrast to the traditional, soviet newsreelstyle reporting, in which the reporter reads a text that is laid over images without any narrative relationship to the words.
Audiences throughout Central Asia also have the opportunity to see stories about their neighbouring countries, to learn about problems and conflicts that national broadcasters will not cover, and that local private broadcasters don't have the resources to cover. Hence the programme informs viewers about issues they need to know about in order to participate more fully in the social and political lives of their countries, and of the region.
Stories from recent programmes include: • Unique footage of Tajikistani casualties from mines on the border with Uzbekistan, despite Uzbekistan's official denials of the existence of the mines; • An investigation into extortion of migrants and travellers by Kazakhstani police; • Stories about unilateral border demarcations by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, splitting towns and families; and • reports of potential vote fraud in Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic.
 Ivan Sigal is regional director of the Central Asia Internews Network (www.internews.org)
Meaningful peacebuilding activities in the region take many forms and operate at many levels, from the street to the highest levels of society, addressing everyday local conflicts like disputes over access to water resources and local markets, as well as cross-border disputes with serious international ramifications. In some cases, those involved may see incremental progress, in a few, a major breakthrough, but often, all that drives them is their conviction that individuals can make a difference. This particular story 1 focuses on non-official dialogue, a story that did not make the headlines x By Jim Wake
In Tajikistan, the collapse of the Soviet Union led not just to independence, but to political instability, and eventually to a fiercely fought civil war. Even during the eighties, as perestroika brought some degree of political freedom throughout the Soviet Union, opposition groups had begun to organize themselves to contest the stranglehold on power held by the long-ruling Tajiks from the northern region around Kojand. These movements forged a coalition and backed a single candidate for the presidency in the first post-independence election, held in November 1991. But the election was rigged, most observers concluded, and the coalition candidate was defeated. In the months following, the government became increasingly repressive, and in May 1992, hostilities broke out. By September 1992, fighting was widespread.
With the outbreak of a full-scale civil war, the United Nations became involved in efforts to restore peace and stability in Tajikistan. In April 1994, government and opposition representatives met in Moscow for three rounds of UN-sponsored negotiations, and agreed to a cease fire. Finally, in June 1997, most of the parties to the conflict signed the "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan".
Positive Vibrations: The Inter-Tajik Dialogue
I I
What is unusual about this process is that, more than a year before the two sides met to engage in "official" negotiations, informal discussions had already begun in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference Regional Conflicts Task Force, a forum for US-Soviet (and later US-Russian) discussions dating back to 1960. The Inter-Tajik Dialogue brought together a small group -ten citizens -divided between pro-government and pro-opposition delegates, to examine the causes of the conflict and, according to Task Force cochairman Harold Saunders, "to see whether a group [could] be formed from within the civil conflict to design a peace process for their own country." Saunders, a former US assistant secretary of state, employed a methodology he had developed called "Sustained Dialogue", which creates a "safe political space" 2 for dialogue and allows for slow, steady, but meaningful progress towards a sustainable peace. Saunders identified five stages in this process: 1. deciding to engage 2. mapping the relationship together 3. probing the dynamics 4. experiencing the relationship by thinking together 5. acting together The idea behind this process is that these unofficial discussions can "focus on relationship issues such as dehumanization, fear, identity, and historical roots that are beyond the scope of mediation and negotiation, by 'reaching toward the heart of the relationship where enemies are made, where reconciliation takes place, and where fundamental change can produce working relationships capable of postconflict peacebuilding. '" 3 During the early meetings, which continued until August 1993, the participants at first spoke to each other about their own feelings about the war, and then addressed the conditions that would be necessary to start actual negotiations. In January 1994, opposition groups, united under the banner of the Coordination Centre of Democratic Forces of Tajikistan, presented a set of proposals regarding a settlement to the pro-government participants. For two days, the two parties discussed this platform. Pro-government participants were convinced that the proposals were serious and could serve as a basis for a negotiations. They took this message to the Tajik government, and shortly thereafter, the government informed the UN special envoy that it would participate in a UN-sponsored peace process.
The participants met again in March 1994 and prepared the first of many memoranda which helped to provide guidance to participants at the official peace negotiations. And so, finally, in April 1994, the actual UNsponsored talks began. They would continue over several years, finally leading to the "General Agreement". Once the peace talks began, the Inter-Tajik dialogue continued to meet in a more "consultative" role, with the aim of "designing a political process of national reconciliation for the country." Several participants also participated in the official negotiations.
It is impossible to know if some other channel for peace talks might have been established had the Inter-Tajik Dialogue not existed, but it is clear that in 1993, the Dialogue was the only channel for communication across the political divide, and one high Tajik official observed that "After six meetings of the Dialogue, it was no longer possible to argue credibly that negotiation between the government and the opposition was impossible." A number of proposals developed by the Dialogue, such as a staged transition to a more inclusive political system, and the establishment of a coordinating council responsible for implementing agreements, were taken up during negotiations and helped shape the General Agreement, which provided for a Commission on National Reconciliation quite similar in function to the Coordinating Council.
Participants in the Dialogue themselves say that they came to understand the roots of the conflict by taking part in the Dialogue, and through a better understanding, they were more willing to moderate their positions and to consider compromises. At present, Tajikistan still has a long way to go before peace, prosperity and stability is assured. But thanks in part to those individuals who came together in the Inter-Tajik Dialogue, there is now hope for the future, and relative peace on the ground.  The first experience relates to the BushPutin summit. Courtesy of CNN, and in the comfort of my own home, I was able to experience the reshaping of history. I was moved by the current rapprochement between the United States of America and Russia. It signifies the beginning of a new era in international relations, and an end to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by these two nations. It also signifies the final hour of a global ideological conflict that has dominated world politics for several decades.
Notes
It should be a time for celebration. Our fears of Armageddon should be replaced by hope for a more stable world. We should be witnessing massive decreases in military spending and the reprioritisation of these resources into social spending, in order to create a more humane and equitable world. Advances in information and biotechnology should be exploited to combat Aids; to provide clean water to the world's poor; to develop techniques to increase food productivity, while at the same time, protecting and preserving our natural environment; and to develop better instruments that would predict natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, cyclones and storms, which devastate the lives of millions of people throughout the world.
Unfortunately, the historic significance and the potential opportunities of the Bush-Putin summit have been overshadowed by the events of September 11, which relate directly to my second experience. When news of the events in New York came over the radio, I was in a taxi in Bonn, Germany, on my way to the Auswärtiges Amt, Aus-und Fortbildungsstatte (Federal Foreign Office) to, ironically, deliver a lecture on conflict management to German foreign service officers. Within a few minutes I was inside the federal building and once again, courtesy of CNN, I was allowed to experience the reshaping of history.
These events have changed the world forever, and yet nothing has changed. Instead of evolving from conflict to peace, we have evolved from conflict to conflict. An ideological conflict has been replaced by an identity conflict. Instead of reprioritising our resources to combat Aids, we are fighting anthrax; instead of providing clean water to the poor, we are spending money protecting the water of the more fortunate; instead of developing techniques for food production and environmental protection, we are developing techniques to prevent terrorism; and instead of developing innovative instruments in order predict earthquakes and cyclones, we are developing advanced weapons and smart bombs with the aim of annihilating each other.
Are we at the end of Fukuyama's history, or at the beginning of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations? However we choose to characterise the world, what is certain is that we will be witnessing a world that will be shaped by new alliances, new hatreds, new enemies and new causes. How will we respond to these new challenges? Are they, in fact, new challenges?
In this last decade, hope and fear consumed the world. We saw hope in South Africa and fear in Rwanda; we saw hope (although only briefly) in Northern Ireland and fear in Bosnia; we saw hope in Palestine and fear in Iraq; and then once again, we saw fear in Palestine. It was a time when we felt hopeful, yet hopeless.
This was also a time when conflict management took centre stage in the work of the United Nations (UN), NGOs, donors, regional organisations and heads of state. There was a scramble to understand the sudden proliferation of conflicts, which led to a proliferation of institutions, mechanisms and instruments aimed at preventing, managing and resolving these conflicts. Academics also made a contribution by publishing a wealth of literature on conflict management.
The world put so much effort into trying to understand and manage conflict. Many will question the wisdom of this investment. I invested ten years of my life in pursuit of a conflict-free world and, on September 11, I questioned the wisdom of my investment. My conclusion has only strengthened both my resolve and determination to continue to contribute towards shaping a better world for our children.
It is incumbent on all of us in the field of conflict management to question our efforts during the last decade. We have to understand why all our efforts have failed to reconcile the disparate interests in the world. The world will continue to be characterised by a complex matrix of interestsranging from individual to institutional -which will result in the continuous shifting of alliances. This is a normal state of human existence.
The challenge we face is to manage these disparate interests so that they coexist within an environment of stability and peace. One can relegate this responsibility to the UN on the basis that this was the reason for its Call for the Establishment of a global framework for co-operation establishment. It is within this context that we need to see the benefits of our efforts during the last ten years. Over the last decade, the one lesson that we have repeatedly learnt is that no single entity is able to reconcile all the interests that characterise contemporary conflicts. The resolution of conflict requires the efforts of several players, who can compliment each other and act in concert. Co-operation, on the basis of comparative advantage, is vital. The last decade has helped us understand our comparative advantages; it has also helped us develop quality working relationships. In our ten years of existence, we have witnessed and experienced this development. In the early 1990s, NGOs, academics and governments met in their exclusive forums. By the end of the last decade, almost every conference, workshop and forum concerned with conflict management included participants from all these groups. Today, the private sector is also showing an increasing interest in getting involved in this vital area.
We have to move our efforts one step further. We have to evolve a Global Framework for Co-operation, which would define the roles and responsibilities of all the actors, and which would guide our collective modus operandi in situations of conflict. This framework should take into account our experiences during the last decade. It should also be based on comparative advantage and mutual respect. The defining parameters have already been established. All we need now is the will to execute our intent! 
Africa
In October 1999, the publication Searching for Peace in Africa was finalised in co-operation with the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD, South Africa). It presents an overview of conflict prevention and management activities of local and international organisations in conflict areas in Africa. Included are 31 surveys of conflict prevention and management activities, several introductory articles, and regional articles that look at recent developments and their relevance in terms of de-escalating violent conflict.
Furthermore it contains a directory with profiles of some 100 African organisations working in the field of conflict prevention and management. Instrumental were the co-operation with ACCORD, and with academic institutions, networks and NGOs in the North and in the conflict areas and the expertise of an international advisory group and regional contacts.
South Asia
The last half of 2001 was mostly spent on finalising surveys and articles for the Central and South Asia section of the Asia project. After the preliminary seminars in India and Sri Lanka in May, authors were asked to provide second drafts which were then send to a number of resource persons, locally and internationally. The response was great, with people providing comments and suggestions, both critical and positive. The next process was to incorporate all the relevant comments and suggestions. Sometimes the authors did this, other times we requested different people to become involved in the writing and finalising of the articles and surveys. Besides the surveys and articles on conflicts in Central and South Asia, also a directory with profiles of 180 organisations was collected and written. Before finalising the Central Asia part of the project, we organised in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in November was organised, in cooperation with the Center for Conflict Management. The purpose of the seminar was to discuss drafts of the surveys and lessons learned specific to the region. The end result was sent to the publisher in the end of January, and the publication will be available in print from July 2002.
S E A R C H I N G F O R P E A C E
We are also happy to welcome 2 new colleagues who started work in January and who are responsible for the Southeast and East Asia part of the Asia project.
Asia & the Pacific
As the final editing was being completed on the Searching for Peace publication on South and Central Asia, the planning began for Searching for Peace in East Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Initial activities have been to involve those members of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention who are active in that region. Their feedback is being sought in regards to the draft outline of the planned publication, as well as our growing inventory of local and international civil society groups working in conflict transformation. Their knowledge will also help in the selection of an Advisory Panel, which will provide guidance for the publication, which is planned for release in 2003.
Before that date, various activities to support peace building and conflict transformation activities are planned. These include seminars and conferences, and supporting coordination and knowledge sharing through policy papers and information exchange. The first conference is planned for May in the Philippines and will focus upon deciding the approach and structure for the publication, building on our network of civil society groups in the region, but will include discussions of lessons learned and workshops. 
Europe & Eurasia
Lessons Learned
The Lessons Learned project is aimed at formulating common lessons learned in the field of conflict prevention. It should contribute to expertise and policy-making on conflict prevention and conflict management. 'Lessons Learned' and 'Best Practices' which experts have judged to be crucial will be T his book, written by Canadian foreign policy practitioners and professionals from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, takes stock of the first phase of a Canadian initiative to develop and lead a radically new foreignpolicy agenda built around the concept of human security. In their personal stories they describe the hurdles which had to be overcome and the lessons which have been learned.
Lloyd Axworthy clarifies the new concept and describes the emergence of the Human Security Network which tries to bridge the gap between a short-term task force approach and the lowest common denominator approach of more traditional international organisations. The new global network of likeminded countries associated with international organisations and NGOs which work together on human security subjects, started with the Lysøn Declaration by Canada and Norway.
After an initial phase, human security has become a central organising principle of international relations and a major catalyst for finding a new approach to conducting diplomacy. The aim of the human security agenda is to construct a global society where the safety of the individual is the central priority. It is aimed at weaving universal humanitarian standards and the rule of law into a coherent web protecting the individual. Those who violate these standards are to be held accountable. Finally, global, regional and bilateral institutions are built and equipped to enhance and enforce the developed standards. Canada is one of the first countries that has made human security a priority of its foreign policy and has tried to involve its citizens in this program.
The emergence of a global civil society brings together states, international organisations, NGOs, and individuals in radically new combinations in an attempt to protect and enhance security by a series of interlocking instruments and policies. The thematic chapters and case studies in the book throw light on the development of a number of new foreign policy instruments and offer some thought on what direction future work should take. Themes covered include among others the evolution of peacekeeping, peace building in postconflict societies, humanitarian military intervention, protecting war-affected children and the evolution of international humanitarian law. The case studies deal with the situation in Sierra Leone, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Haiti, Guatemala, Kosovo and Angola.
Attention is drawn to the principal lessons of a task-force approach which has resulted in a 'new diplomacy'. A new connectivity based on the use of modern communication technologies has been instrumental to the emergence of a global civil society based on a set of shared values, which has changed the political landscape. Connectivity not only breaks down walls, it makes borders porous, erodes traditional hierarchies, promotes lateral thinking and unconventional networks animated by like-mindedness and shared values.
The key issues identified for a fairly rapid follow-up are:
small arms and light weapons; humanitarian intervention; expert civilian deployments; international civilian police; UN sanctions; ICC; war-affected children; human rights field operations, the economic agendas of conflict; the establishment of a culture of prevention; and post-conflict peace building. This inspirational book underlines the major tasks ahead of those of us who are active in the field of conflict prevention in the attempt to counter the dark forces of globalisation. By inspiring the right people, by using soft power creatively and by creating the most suitable networks a world may be created in which fewer people are threatened by fear and more people live in greater safety.  Developments related to the Human Security Network can be tracked on the following website: http://dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/protectingpeople/
